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1  Introduction 
 
Venture capitalist Marc Andreessen proclaimed in 2011 that ‘software is eating the world’, 
suggesting that economic and technological developments would see software companies 
poised to take over large swathes of the economy (Andreessen 2011). Digital technology 
[software] is capable of eating the world because of both its utility and its pervasiveness. 
Indeed, digital technology has been classified as a General Purpose Technology (GPT) due 
to its implications not just for the economy, but for all aspects of life (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee 2014). According to Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), GPTs have three key 
characteristics: (i) they must be ‘pervasive’ meaning they affect almost all sectors; (ii) they 
improve over time and thus lower the costs for users; (iii) they must facilitate innovation by 
making it easier to create and make novel products and/or processes. Digital technology is 
currently used in just about every sector in developed countries and increasingly in 
developing countries, the cost of personal computers has dropped from thousands of dollars 
a few years ago to a couple of hundred dollars, and even the smallest devices today have 
more processing power and memory than the most powerful supercomputers of the mid-
twentieth century. Furthermore, digital technology has enabled the introduction of new 
products and services such as 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, driverless cars, cloud 
computing and the Internet of Things. 
 
As digital technology has begun to ‘eat the world’ it has also influenced the way that humans 
interact and transact with each other. Thus, it has inevitably had an effect on global, 
regional, national and local economies. This Evidence Report reviews the literature 
assessing the economic impact of digital technologies – namely information communication 
technology (ICT) – on economies and people. In terms of the economic effects of digital 
technology on economies, this literature review summarises its relationship with economic 
growth and productivity. Although increases in ICT infrastructure/equipment investment and 
increased ICT adoption tend to be strongly correlated with economic growth and productivity, 
causality is yet to be resolved, and the potential for endogenous, simultaneous and reverse 
causality remains. In other words, there is still the possibility that the economic impacts of 
the internet are caused by a third variable, that the economic impacts lead to internet 
adaption at the same time that internet adaption leads to economic impacts, and that it is 
economic growth that causes internet adaption rather than vice versa. Furthermore, the 
correlations tend to be highly heterogeneous – different across space and time – suggesting 
that the relationship is not always given.  
 
This review also summarises the literature concerning the effects of digital technology on 
employment and inequality. Although there is anecdotal evidence that ICTs have created 
more jobs than they have displaced, most scholars agree that digital technologies will mostly 
displace jobs in the short and medium term as digital technology continues to eat the world. 
Furthermore, the technological change accelerated by digital technology tends to be skill-
biased, allowing workers capable of leveraging digital technologies to demand higher wages 
while decreasing the demand for workers unable to leverage technology. This leads to a 
decrease in their wages and to a hollowing out of the middle class, a decoupling of 
productivity and wages, and a move from a normal income distribution curve (in which the 
‘average person’ is at the middle of the distribution and the amount of people continue to 
drop precipitously as you move away from the average towards either tail of the curve) to a 
power-law or Pareto income distribution curve in which the majority of the population are at 
the lower end of the income distribution as seen below (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014).  
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Figure 1.1   Normal and power-law income distribution curves 
 
Source: Adapted from Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). 
 
Although most of the aforementioned trends were first uncovered and felt in developed 
countries, the evidence now points to the emergence of similar trends in many developing 
countries. This Evidence Report consists of six sections. This introduction is followed by a 
synthesis of the evidence and debates in the literature concerning the impact of digital 
technologies on economic growth, productivity, employment and inequality in Sections 2 
through 5 respectively. The sixth section concludes the report with a summary of the 
evidence and debates as well as some recommendations for researchers and policymakers. 
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2 Economic growth 
2.1 Correlations between communication technologies and 
economic growth 
Rather than being a set thing, digital is an adjective ‘describing an increasing information 
intensity and connectedness of physical resources’ (Accenture 2013). Due to its ubiquity and 
diversity, it is impossible to capture the impact of digital technology as a whole on economic 
growth. Instead, the term ‘digital technology’ is typically used interchangeably with ‘ICT 
Investment’ and different sets of ICTs such as computers, the internet or mobile phones. 
Thus, studies are typically limited to the impacts of one or a few instruments of digital 
technology rather than digital technology as a whole. ICTs are often touted as engines of 
growth. This chapter reviews the evidence behind such claims.  
 
Early aggregate studies of the impact of the internet on economic growth such as 
Koutroumpis (2009) and Czernich et al. (2009) focused mainly on the European 
Union/United States, and OECD countries. These studies found that a 10 per cent increase 
in internet penetration correlates with a 0.9–1.5 and a 0.3–0.9 percentage point (pp) in gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth respectively. Other than Garcia Zaballos and Lopez-Rivas 
(2012), who found that broadband correlates with a 3.2 per cent increase in GDP in 26 Latin 
American countries, much less work has been done with sets of developing countries 
(Minges 2015). However, there are some studies that look at the impact of the internet and 
other ICTs at a global level while classifying countries into different economic development 
levels. 
 
A study by Qiang et al. (2009)1 has been widely cited as showing the impacts of ICT on 
economic growth (Dalberg 2013b; World Bank 2016; McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) 2014; 
Deloitte 2014; Minges 2015; among others). It showed that a 10pp increase in broadband 
penetration correlates with GDP growth of 1.38pp. Some studies mention this figure – 
1.38pp – as proof that various types of digital technology lead to growth. However, attributing 
the same effects to all kinds of internet connections is misleading. The study shows that 
fixed telephony, mobile telephony, [dial-up] internet, and broadband all have different effects 
on economic growth in ascending order (Qiang et al. 2009). Similarly, in a study of 107 
countries (although not categorised by income level) Vu (2011) finds that personal 
computers, mobile phones and the internet all have positive effects on economic growth in 
ascending order. Katz and Callorda (2013) found that broadband penetration led to an 
average annual increase in income of 3.67 per cent respectively overall in Ecuador, but that 
the gains were higher for computer and internet users at 3.92 and 5.01 per cent respectively. 
The discrepancy between mobile, dial-up and broadband may be partially explained by the 
fact that broadband users spend 64 per cent more time browsing the web and use it for more 
content-intensive and socially interactive purposes (Qiang et al. 2009).  
 
 
 
                                               
1 Often cited under World Bank rather than Qiang et al. 
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Table 2.1 Correlations with GDP growth for every 10pp increase in 
internet penetration 
Study Country/Region Years Correlation with 
GDP growth 
Koutrompis (2009) 22 OECD countries 2002–2007 0.9–1.5pp 
Czernich et al. (2009) 25 OECD countries 1996–2007 0.3–0.9pp 
Garcia Zaballos and 
Lopez-Rivas (2012) 
26 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries 
2003–2009 3.2pp 
Qiang et al. (2009) 120 countries 
Developed countries 
Developing countries 
 
1980–2006 
1980–2006 
 
1.21pp 
1.38pp 
Scott (2012) 120 countries 
Developed countries 
Developing countries 
 
1980–2011 
1980–2011 
 
1.19pp 
1.35pp 
Source: Author’s own, based on Minges (2015) 
 
Qiang et al. (2009: 45) found that an increase in national broadband penetration rate of 10pp 
would lead to a 1.21pp and 1.38pp increase in GDP per capita growth in developed and 
developing countries respectively. However, the broadband and internet results were less 
statistically significant in developing countries because of lower uptake levels. Much has 
changed since 2006 – the last year in their data. Broadband is now approaching ubiquity in 
many developed countries and internet adoption has tripled in developing countries since 
2005 (World Bank 2016). Faster broadband technologies have been developed while most 
new internet users in developing countries are getting their first and only tastes of the 
internet via mobile phones. In 2006, 3G mobile internet was still an emerging technology. 
Today, 4G mobile broadband is already commonplace in many markets and 5G is already in 
the pipeline – its speeds are expected to dwarf anything around today (CNET 2015).  
 
There is a lack of current studies measuring the effects of different speeds of ICTs as well as 
switching from older technologies to newer ones. These studies may need to be updated 
periodically to keep up with advancements in communication technology and speed. One 
such attempt was made when Qiang et al.’s study was replicated by Scott (2012) to include 
five extra years of data. The study seemed to confirm Qiang et al.’s finding about the returns 
to broadband and the literature often makes note of this (World Economic Forum 2015). 
However, although the extra five years yielded a very similar correlation between broadband 
and economic growth – 1.38pp and 1.35pp respectively – in developing countries, there 
were significant decreases in the effect of mobile and low bandwidth internet to economic 
growth – from 1.12pp to 0.93pp and 0.81pp to 0.40pp respectively. The figure below shows 
Scott’s (2012) and Qiang et al.’s (2009) findings. The data in Scott (2012) goes as far as 
2011.  
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Figure 2.1 GDP growth impact from 10pp increase in different ICTs 
 
Source: Adapted from Minges (2015), based on data from Qiang et al. (2009) and Scott (2012). 
 
Deloitte (2012) attempted to address the gap concerning the impact of switching ICT 
technologies by measuring the effects of switching from 2G mobile wireless to 3G. They 
found that a 10 per cent substitution of 2G for 3G correlated with an average increase of 
GDP per capita of 0.15 per cent in a group of 96 countries. Furthermore, adding 3G 
connections seemed to be more beneficial for countries with low 3G penetration. A doubling 
of mobile data use is associated with an increase in GDP per capita of 0.5pp. Furthermore, 
Ericsson (2013) also suggests that broadband speed matters. A doubling speed was 
correlated with a 0.3 per cent increase in GDP and increasing speed from 0.5 to 4 megabits 
per second (Mbps) was correlated with increases in income for households in Brazil, India, 
and China of US$46 per month.2  
2.1.1 Causality and heterogeneity  
The previous sub-section focused on correlations between GDP and economic growth at the 
aggregate level (e.g. entire regions or the world). However, it may not be representative to 
treat all countries in aggregate groups as homogenous and correlations alone do not 
establish causality. This section begins by questioning causality and then focuses on the 
heterogeneity of correlations in single countries. Not all studies conclude that the internet 
leads to economic growth. In a study of 162 countries, including 115 ‘non high-income 
countries’, Meijers (2012) argues that the internet does not directly impact economic growth 
after controlling for standard variables.3 Instead, he argues that increases in internet 
penetration increase trade leading to economic growth. This study built on past studies by 
Clarke and Wallsten (2006), Freund and Weinhold (2004), and Vemuri and Siddiqi (2009) 
which all showed that the internet had positive relationships with international trade. 
According to Meijers, ‘internet use is impacting trade more significantly than the other way 
around and international trade impacts economic growth more significantly than internet 
growth’ (Meijers 2012: 3).   
 
Meijers also argues that increases in international trade facilitated by the internet have 
spurred more economic growth in developing countries than developed ones while the 
                                               
2 The authors warn that the sample size is small and the results are not statistically significant. 
3 Variables in Meijers’ (2012) model include investment, government expenditure, rate of inflation, openness, and time 
dummies. 
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impact of economic trade on economic growth is the same for both sets of countries. A 10pp 
increase in internet use correlates with an increase in the openness ratio4 of 3.12pp and 
5.3pp which correlates with a 0.15pp and 0.27pp increase in GDP growth in high and non-
high income countries respectively. He suggests that the internet reduces more barriers to 
market and information access and transaction costs in developing countries, whereas these 
barriers are already low in developed countries that have already achieved internet maturity 
(Meijers 2012).  
 
To say that the internet has a greater effect on economic growth in developing countries 
treats them as a homogenous group but this is far from the case. Using a sample of 62 
countries in different income levels, Yousefi (2011) finds that ICTs have a higher impact on 
GDP in upper middle-income countries than in low-income countries. This finding suggests 
that developing countries at different income levels extract value from the internet at different 
rates and that GDP growth is not necessarily dependent on ICT investment. Moreover, 
heterogeneity is further apparent when considering country-level studies. A 10 per cent 
increase in broadband correlates with increases in GDP of 0.44, 2.14, and 3.67 per cent in 
Panama, China and Ecuador respectively (Katz and Koutroumpis 2012a; Feng and Ma 2013 
in Minges 2015; Katz and Callorda 2013; Minges 2015). Katz and Koutroumpis (2012b and 
2012c) showed no significant impact of broadband on GDP between 2000 and 2010 in the 
Philippines and Senegal. The Senegalese did, however, show a 0.44 per cent increase in 
GDP associated with a 10 per cent increase in 2G mobile penetration, suggesting that 
whether or not broadband or mobile is more important to growth may also vary by country 
(ibid. 2012c). The table below summarises the findings of these studies.  
Table 2.2  Correlations between GDP growth and internet penetration in 
single country studies 
Study Country Years Correlation with GDP growth for every 
10% increase in internet penetration 
Katz and Koutrompis (2012b) Panama 2000–2010  0.44 
Feng and Ma (2013 in 
Minges 2015) 
China 2004–2009  2.14 
Katz and Callorda (2013) Ecuador 2008–2012 3.67 
Katz and Koutrompis (2012a) Philippines 2001–2010  0.02 (statistically insignificant) 
Katz and Koutrompis (2012c) Senegal 2003–2011  -0.03 (statistically insignificant) 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Minges (2015).  
 
It is also important to note that although GDP growth is the most widely used metric for 
economic growth, its use is contested. Many scholars, including the Nobel Laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz, argue that an increase in GDP per capita does not necessarily coincide with an 
increase in living standards or citizen wellbeing.  
 
GDP per capita does not say anything about how well most citizens are doing; it can 
be going up even though most citizens’ incomes are declining (as has been 
happening in the United States). GDP focuses on production in the country, not on 
incomes earned by those in the country, and takes no account of environmental 
degradation or resource depletion, or, more broadly, of sustainability. 
(Stiglitz 2011: 235) 
 
                                               
4 ‘The openness ratio as measured by imports plus exports as ratio of GDP is expected to catch the benefits coming from 
international trade’ (Meijers 2012: 6-7). 
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Moreover, although economic growth and digital technologies tend to have strong 
correlations, no one has yet resolved causality. A widely cited 2009 study by Qiang et al. 
was unable to disprove that the relationship between internet penetration and economic 
growth was due to chance, while Scott (2012) stated that he did not have time to test the 
null-hypothesis. Thus, the jury is still out on whether the relationships uncovered in these two 
widely cited studies are causal or due to chance or an unobserved variable. ‘Faster growing 
countries have more resources and economic opportunities available to invest in ICT 
infrastructure; thus, the direction of causality may run from growth to ICT rather than the 
other way around’ (World Bank 2016: 56). Therefore it is possible to argue that the economic 
impacts of the internet are caused by a third variable; that the economic impacts lead to 
internet adoption at the same time that internet adoption leads to economic impacts, and that 
it is economic growth that causes internet adoption rather than vice versa. The heterogeneity 
of findings and the lack of established causation warrant a few questions. Is reverse, mutual, 
or third variable causality possibly at play? Why do countries seem to gain from the internet 
differently? If ICTs do lead to growth, through what mechanisms do they do so?  
2.2 Mechanisms  
The two previous sub-sections focused on the relationships between digital technology 
adoption and economic growth at the aggregate and country level respectively. Although the 
potential for reverse or no causality has not been widely explored in the literature – other 
than in Meijers (2012) – mechanisms have been identified by which it is believed that the 
internet facilitates economic growth. Currently, these mechanisms are mostly mentioned in 
passing and taken as given without much effort to prove that they are occurring or to quantify 
their economic impact. There is a need for studies that delve deeper into these mechanisms 
to determine which mechanisms are most important and under what conditions. Having an 
understanding of these mechanisms could prove beneficial in being able to forecast whether 
increasing internet penetration in developing countries will have an impact on growth and 
what kind of impact it will have. The following are some of the mechanisms mentioned in the 
literature:  
 
 Fostering inclusion through access to information; increasing efficiency and 
productivity through automation and coordination; increasing innovation through 
scale economies and cooperation; reducing barriers to newcomer firms (World Bank 
2016) 
 Helping companies to reach economies of scale (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014)  
 Fostering technology diffusion; improving decision-making quality for households and 
firms and resource allocation 
 Reducing production costs and increasing demand and investment (Vu 2011) 
 Increasing international trade, lowering transaction costs, improving quality and 
lowering the cost of offshoring functions thus stimulating international trade (Meijers 
2012)  
 Increasing information flows, innovation, financial capital access, entrepreneurship, 
and enhancing labour; increasing access to markets and giving rise to the micro-
multinational (small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that can go global from day 
one) (Deloitte 2014) 
 Reducing information asymmetries between buyers and sellers and reducing the 
need for intermediaries (Jensen 2007; Aker 2008) 
 Providing economic agents with empowering information and increasing firm 
efficiency and competitiveness (Yousefi 2011)  
 Rejuvenating traditional sectors; 75 per cent of the gains of the internet is captured 
by non-internet companies (MGI 2011)  
 Overcoming infrastructure limitations through new platforms like M-Pesa (KPMG 
2012). 
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Thompson and Garbacz (2011) break down the effects of the internet on economic growth 
into direct and indirect impacts. Direct impacts include generating investment, increasing 
employment, increasing two-way information-sharing, cutting transaction costs, and 
facilitating education and skill development. Indirect impacts include increasing efficiency, 
and network externalities. Figure 2.2 illustrates these mechanisms. 
Figure 2.2 Broadband’s direct and indirect impacts on economic growth 
 
Source: Adapted from Thompson and Garbacz (2011). 
 
Digital technologies have enabled the development of new platforms that can transform the 
way economies function, especially in rural areas. Mobile money has provided a banking 
alternative for millions of people previously unable to use banking services, has facilitated 
new business models for organisations operating on top of the platform, and introduced 
electronic payments in places that previously lacked them (World Bank 2016; KPMG 2012). 
Mobile money has been widely cited as an M4P (Markets for the Poor) approach because it 
facilitates ‘systemic change’ in entire markets making it easier for everyone – especially the 
poor – to do business (KPMG 2012). Thus, digital innovations have the potential to improve 
the functioning of markets by overcoming economic constraints and limited infrastructure, 
and could potentially accelerate leapfrogging and inclusion in other areas if the right 
platforms are built.  
2.3 Leapfrogging  
One of the major mechanisms by which digital technologies are expected to lead to 
economic growth is through leapfrogging. Steinmueller (2001) and others have written about 
the possibility that digital technologies could provide developing countries with a platform to 
catch up with developed countries by ‘leapfrogging’ conventional methods of increasing 
productivity. However, it is also possible that developing countries could benefit less from 
ICT investments than developed ones if they are not well prepared to take advantage of the 
technology (Niebel 2014). Steinmueller (2001) proposes four prerequisites for leapfrogging:  
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 Absorptive capacities: the ability to produce or use ICTs often acquired through tacit 
knowledge rather than manuals  
 Access to equipment and ‘know-how’ to make productive use of ICTs 
 Availability and linkages with other complementary technologies and sectors 
 Downstream integration capabilities: creation of internal markets, logistical 
capabilities and marketing capabilities to convince users of their utility, reliability and 
value. 
 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies had found a higher impact of ICT investment in 
developing countries than developed ones. However, a study of 59 countries categorised as 
developing, emerging and developed countries finds that although all three country groups 
showed a positive relationship between economic growth and ICT investment, there are only 
small differences in the impact of ICTs between the three groups (Niebel 2014). Thus there 
is no clear evidence that developing countries are disproportionately gaining from ICT 
investments or ‘leapfrogging’.  
2.4 Impacts of ICT on poverty 
Despite no proof of causality, powerful narratives seeking to expand internet penetration like 
Internet.org by Facebook – which would benefit economically from more people being online 
– and other private tech company-led initiatives have cited studies like Deloitte (2014) which 
projects that expanding internet access in developing countries will lift 160 million people out 
of poverty (Zuckerberg 2014). Furthermore, Zuckerburg has also claimed that one person is 
lifted out of poverty for every 10 people gaining internet access and that connecting the 4 
billion people who are currently offline can lift 400 million people out of poverty (McFarland 
2016). Schradie (2013) challenged Zuckerberg (2013) in an open letter for citing claims by 
the McKinsey Global Institute (2011) that the internet leads to economic growth based solely 
on correlations. At the macro level, correlations between ICT and economic growth often get 
conflated with correlations between economic growth and poverty reduction to argue that 
ICTs have a significant and positive impact on poverty reduction. The World Economic 
Forum (2015: 32) says, for example, that the ‘impact[s] of ICT on economic growth and 
poverty alleviation are undeniable, and greater adoption of ICTs in lower-income countries 
can accelerate income gains at the base of the economic pyramid’; and that although there 
is a lack of evidence showing that ICTs reduce poverty, decreases in poverty are strongly 
correlated with ICT adoption at the country level.  
 
Much of the work done on the effect of ICTs on poverty looks at differences between 
adopters and non-adopters of digital technology despite the potential that they may be 
inherently different. These studies tend to focus on mobile phones since the internet and 
computers have not been widely diffused at the bottom of the pyramid. May et al. (2014) find 
that although poverty statuses worsened for non-users of digital technology, adopters 
experienced a 27 per cent improvement in their poverty status in Kenya, Rwanda and 
Uganda. However, once again, there is a strong possibility of reverse causality since the 
chances of gaining access to ICTs doubled with every unit increase in the poverty score.  
 
Klonner and Nolen (2008) find that mobile coverage roll-out is beneficial for people who are 
extremely poor, but has no significant effect on those in moderate poverty in rural South 
Africa. May et al. (2014) also suggest that mobile access disproportionately benefits the very 
poor compared to the moderately poor although by a small margin. However, ‘even if 
economic benefits do exceed costs for the poor, the costs are greater and the benefits are 
lower than for rich users. It is therefore possible that ICTs simultaneously help reduce 
absolute poverty levels but increase overall income inequalities’ (Heeks 2014: 15). This 
possibility becomes even clearer if you take into account that returns to broadband are 
higher than returns to mobile phones (Scott 2012). Katz and Callorda (2013) showed that 
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returns to broadband were disproportionately higher for computer and internet users in 
Ecuador.  
 
Moreover, mobile phones do not automatically ‘economically empower’ the poor. In fact, the 
poor often end up paying more for mobile phone use both in relative and absolute terms. For 
example, the average cost of operating a mobile phone is 18 per cent of gross national 
income (GNI) per capita in Africa – and as high as 53 per cent in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo – but only 1.47 per cent of GNI per capita in Europe (ITU 2015). Thus, Africans 
spend a relatively high price for mobile phone access. Moreover, the poor don’t always 
choose to use mobile phones for business purposes, even when they have a micro-
enterprise (Mpogole, Usanga and Tedre 2008). A survey of 22 rural villages in Tanzania 
showed that only 7 per cent of respondents purchased a phone for business purposes while 
74 per cent of them did so for maintaining social relationships. In the survey, 79.5 per cent of 
respondents did not agree that owning a mobile phone helps reduce income poverty and 
about half of them believed that the costs of owning a mobile phone were greater than the 
benefits. In a survey of mobile-owning women micro-entrepreneurs in rural India, only 10 per 
cent regularly used their mobile phone to conduct business (Chew et al. 2011). In Sri Lanka, 
a quarter of the poorest people reported that owning and maintaining mobile phones has 
deteriorated their capacity to save (de Silva and Zainudeen 2006; Mpogole et al. 2008). The 
opportunity costs of owning a mobile device are especially high for those living in off-grid 
rural areas, forcing them to forgo many productive hours of work to walk long distances – 3 
to 7km – to nearby towns or cities several times a week to wait for their phone to charge 
(ibid. 2013). Katengeza et al. (2014) found that other things being equal, distance to an 
electricity source reduces the likelihood that farmers partake in ICT-based projects. 
 
Heeks (2014) conceptualises the effects of ICT on poverty reduction by putting forward three 
categories of direct ICT application and three perspectives on poverty eradication. 
Categories of ICT application include other ICT uses, enterprise ICT use and ICT sector use. 
Other ICT uses include economic or non-economic information flows and transactions to or 
from users in poor communities. Enterprise ICT is defined by the use of ICTs at work. ICT 
sector use refers to the use of ICTs to generate income such as selling mobile phones or 
top-up cards. Perspectives on poverty eradication include: economic, livelihood and 
capabilities. The economic perspective of poverty reduction aims to tackle poverty 
eradication through income generation. The livelihoods perspective seeks to facilitate the 
accumulation of assets including information, skills and health. The capabilities approach 
seeks to facilitate transitions into new ‘roles’. Table 2.3 includes examples of these 
applications and perspectives. Heeks suggests that the more you move towards the bottom 
right in this figure, the greater the impact on poverty reduction, but with one caveat: fewer 
people are affected.  
Table 2.3 Summary of Heeks (2014) framework 
 Other ICT uses Enterprise ICT use ICT sector 
Economic ICT-enabled journey 
substitution 
ICT-enabled income from 
market information 
ICT-based employment 
income 
Livelihoods Health information ICT-enabled customer 
networks 
ICT-based employment 
assets 
Capabilities ICT-enabled 
government services 
Production of digital content ICT innovation 
Source: Heeks (2014). 
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3 Productivity 
3.1 Productivity gains from the Digital Revolution 
One of the main mechanisms by which technological progress is expected to affect 
economic prosperity is through increasing productivity. Robert Gordon (2012) divides 
technological progress since the 1750s into three ‘Industrial Revolutions’ (IRs) facilitated by 
General Purpose Technologies (GPTs). The first IR (1750–1830) was powered by the 
creation of the steam engine, railroads and cotton spinning; the second (1870–1900) 
included the introduction of electricity, the internal combustion engine and indoor plumbing; 
the third IR (1972–today) – also known as the ‘Digital Revolution’ – is the one powered by 
ICTs, the internet, and other digital technologies. 
 
Gordon (2012), Cowen (2011) and others argue that the Digital Revolution has not spurred 
as much productivity growth as the previous two industrial revolutions for countries on the 
technological frontier. Gordon uses the measures of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
throughout the three IRs to make his point. The figure below shows Gordon’s results. His 
analysis suggests that the high levels of TFP gains during the Digital Revolution have been 
short-lived compared to those of the second IR – eight years compared to 81 years – in the 
US, and that TFP is back on the decline.   
Figure 3.1 Average growth rates of US labour productivity over selected 
intervals, 1891–2012 
 
Source: Adapted from Gordon (2012). 
 
He further attempts to attribute greater importance to the innovations of the second IR over 
the Digital Revolution through the following thought experiment in which readers choose 
between two options:  
 
With option A you are allowed to keep 2002 electronic technology, including your 
Windows 98 laptop accessing Amazon, and you can keep running water and indoor 
toilets; but you can’t use anything invented since 2002. 
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Option B is that you get everything invented in the past decade right up to Facebook, 
Twitter, and the iPad, but you have to give up running water and indoor toilets. You 
have to haul the water into your dwelling and carry out the waste. Even at 3am on a 
rainy night, your only toilet option is a wet and perhaps muddy walk to the outhouse. 
Which option do you choose?  
(Gordon 2012: 14) 
 
However, Gordon can be misleading for three reasons. Firstly, it seems speculative and too 
early to argue that the major technologies driving the Digital Revolution have already been 
determined and that future digital technologies cannot revive TFP. Gordon acknowledges 
that it took about a century to see all the benefits of previous industrial revolutions. Kelly 
(2013) argues that starting the third industrial revolution at the 1960s with the introduction of 
computational computers does not accurately capture its starting point. To him, the Digital 
Revolution started in the 1990s with the beginning of the networking of everything – when 
‘the telephone married the computer’ and ordinary people began using the commercial 
internet. Under Kelly’s start date we have 80 more years of potential gains to go. However, 
these dates are both arbitrary and open to debate. Only time will tell how far along the Digital 
Revolution we are today and whether it will indeed take 100 years to capture its full gains. As 
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow said in an interview, projecting future gains from the Digital 
Revolution may just be ‘testing whether you are a [technology] optimist or a pessimist’ 
(EconTalk.org 2014).  
 
Secondly, as Gordon admits, his data only reflects the reality of the United States and other 
countries on the technological frontier. Although electrification, running water, indoor toilets, 
and other second IR technologies have diffused widely throughout developed countries, the 
same is not true for many developing countries. Although digital technologies are also far 
from ubiquitous, the number of households owning a mobile phone exceeds those with 
access to improved sanitation, bank accounts or electricity (World Bank 2012). With 
developing countries projected to continue increasing mobile and internet penetration at 
faster rates than developed countries, and at a rate faster than they adopt indoor plumbing 
or electricity, it would be hard to argue that ‘IR #2’ is more important than the Digital 
Revolution in regards to raising living standards in developing countries. Given that mobile 
phones have diffused before technologies that predated them by many decades, Gordon’s 
IRs do not seem to be playing out sequentially in developing countries. The 2016 World 
Development Report argues that a lack of analogue complements – mostly from IR #2 – is 
what currently prevents developing countries from adopting and benefiting more swiftly from 
digital technology (World Bank 2016).  
 
Thirdly, Gordon (2012) uncovers six headwinds that are holding the US back from higher 
productivity gains: an aging population, stagnant education levels, high levels of consumer 
and government debt, rising inequality, outsourcing and globalisation, and environmental 
constraints. These ‘headwinds’ are particular to the US and it is obvious that some of them, 
such as aging populations, are not an issue in many developing countries. Furthermore, the 
fact that headwinds are capable of holding a technology back from increasing TFP might 
mean that there are potentially a lot of other factors affecting its measurement beyond a set 
of (digital) technologies alone. 
3.2 Measurement issues and consumer surplus 
Although widely used, growth in TFP and GDP as indicators of productivity and economic 
growth is contested. There has been a clash between scholars who continue to use these 
indicators and others who believe them to be outdated. During a streamed academic debate 
between Erik Brynjolfsson and Tyler Cowen (2011), Brynjolfsson argues that rather than 
stagnating productivity, countries on the technological frontier are experiencing faster 
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innovation and productivity growth than ever, but that the average worker is not keeping up 
with technological change, thus keeping TFP low. The issue with using TFP to measure 
productivity gains from digital technology is that it subtracts gains from laying people off and 
replacing them. This is something digital technology does very well through automation.  
 
Brynjolfsson argues that this metric currently does not account for the work that robots and 
machines do and thus undervalues its effects. Economists in Silicon Valley agree. TFP and 
measurements used to estimate economic growth – GDP – do not capture the introduction 
of goods that were previously non-existent, improvements in quality, quicker responses, 
increased variety, and time lags in productivity payoffs due to the necessity to complement 
ICTs with other investments (Brynjolfsson 1993).  
 
Furthermore, there are many digital products and services that we enjoy for free but that do 
not show up in GDP or productivity statistics. Thus, these figures are not capturing all of the 
ways that technology is advancing productivity, especially on the consumer side. In order for 
any product or service to be included in GDP statistics they need to have a dollar figure 
associated with them (Coyle 2014). However, users of the internet are able to access 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Gmail and many other online services and platforms 
without paying despite those services providing users with value.5 Kelly (2013) argues that 
Gordon and other economists tend to ‘fetishize’ GDP and productivity statistics and thus only 
focus on how much ‘labour saving’ is accomplished. He argues that wealth in the future will 
not depend on saving labour, but on creating new labour and novel things to do, and that an 
emphasis on GDP and productivity underplays the human ability and desire to experiment, 
explore, create art, play and do other fulfilling things that we value. To Kelly, optimisation is 
something for machines rather than humans.  
 
Furthermore, Kelly (2013) argues that rather than linearly improving things that we already 
do more efficiently, the Digital Revolution is evolving the economic landscape into an 
economy with increased complexity, more interdependency, and a decreasing emphasis on 
ownership, all of which are not necessarily well captured by old metrics. Our current 
measures are good at capturing traditional activities and how our efficiency in doing those 
activities has improved. Kelly argues that we don’t just want more from less, but we would 
also like different and new products, ideas and technologies. Moreover, Coyle (2014) argues 
that the productivity gains in services are very hard to measure. For example, increases in 
productivity require workers to do more with less, suggesting that a teacher teaching the 
same number of students would never be able to increase productivity although we value 
small class sizes. The teaching example highlights one of the biggest critiques of GDP and 
productivity measures; they fail to fully capture improvements in quality both in services and 
products.  
 
However, whether current technologies have a bigger consumer surplus than past ones is 
up for debate. Urban sewage systems and indoor plumbing also had significant consumer 
surpluses that were not accounted for in GDP. The streets no longer smelled bad and 
people got sick less often as a result. Furthermore, although it is possible to put a price tag 
on antibiotics, it is very hard to put a price tag on surviving an illness that was not possible 
without antibiotics. Nathan Mayer Rothschild, the world’s richest man in 1836, died of a tooth 
ulcer, something he would easily survive today with an antibiotic worth just 10 dollars (Coyle 
2014).  
 
 
                                               
5 Although users do not pay for these services, they are heavily monetised. With these new ‘free’ web-based services, the user 
too becomes a product as their data is collated, analysed and sold to third parties.  
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Box 3.1 Consumer surplus at the base of the pyramid  
The benefits that the poor receive from mobile phones are also not purely economic and an 
emphasis on the economic may overlook their full gains. The fact that poor people are willing to 
spend a greater share of their income both in relative and absolute terms (Heeks 2014) for 
connectivity suggests that it provides significant value to them. There is very little work 
concentrating on consumer surplus at the base of the pyramid. 
 
Kivunike et al. (2011) found that users of mobile phones in rural communities in Uganda 
disproportionately cited social reasons for owning a mobile phone including entertainment and 
maintaining social relationships rather than economic ones. Although they have not been 
necessarily labelled as consumer surpluses in the literature, the bottom of the pyramid seems to 
gain from digital technology in the form of lower prices, greater safety, less time spent on travelling, 
better communication with migrant relatives, better access to health care and improved resilience 
to natural disasters (Jensen 2007; Mehta 2013; Rahman et al. 2013). 
 
In a study of the fish market in Kerala, India, Jensen (2007) found that mobile phone coverage roll-
out was associated with a 4 per cent decrease in the price of fish and a 6 per cent increase in 
sardine consumption as well as spillover effects to fishermen who did not adopt mobile phones. In 
a survey in rural Bangladesh, 71 per cent of women said that they felt more secure with mobile 
phones (Rahman et al. 2013). In both India and Bangladesh, mobile phones were found to increase 
the speed of urban–rural remittances, significantly improving the safety of migrants returning home 
on trains who had previously been subject to attacks because they were known to be carrying 
money (Mehta 2013; Rahman et al. 2013). Savings in time and increased savings have thus led to 
greater real returns to migration. This partially explains why members of rural households with at 
least one migrant worker are more likely to have mobile phones in India although some of those do 
solely use their mobile phones to receive phone calls from their migrant relative (Mehta 2013). 
 
Access to health information via the internet or through contact with health professionals can lead 
to improved health outcomes (Mehta 2013). Consumers in rural Bangladesh claim mobile phones 
and ICT have helped them save money in health care and improved service. Furthermore, almost 
80 per cent of respondents in rural Bangladesh said that they used their mobile phones during 
medical emergencies (Rahman et al. 2013). Mobile phone networks have proven to be more 
resilient during natural disasters and the mobile phone itself has become a major focal point of 
early warnings, and has accelerated rescue and relief efforts (Rahman et al. 2013). 
3.3 Evidence of productivity gains 
The literature measuring productivity gains from digital technology can be classified into two 
strands. One measures the impact of investments in ICT on productivity and a more recent 
strand measures the impact of adopting specific ICT technologies – mobile and broadband – 
on productivity. 
3.3.1 ICT investment and productivity 
This sub-section summarises the literature concerning the relationship between ICT 
investment and productivity. Studies did not find positive relationships between ICT 
investment and productivity in the 1980s and 1990s. The lack of evidence led the 
relationship between ICT and productivity to be called the ‘Productivity Paradox’ or ‘Solow’s 
Paradox’ named after the Nobel Laureate economist Robert Solow who in 1987 said: ‘We 
see computers everywhere except in productivity statistics’ (Brynjolfsson 1993; Solow 1987). 
This changed near the turn of the century thanks to newly available data and methodologies 
(Papaioannou and Dimelis 2007).  
 
However, those studies first showed that ICT investments were associated with productivity 
gains in developed countries but not developing countries, leading some to believe that they 
would be left out of the productivity gains of ICTs (Dedrick et al. 2013; Dewan and Kraemer 
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2000; Pohjola 2000; Lee et al. 2005). Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) found that 
developing countries were beginning to benefit from ICT investment between 1993 and 
2001, but gains were still much lower for developing countries. In a study of 42 developing 
and developed countries between 1993 and 2001, Dimelis and Papaioannou (2009) found 
that there was a positive correlation in both developing and developed countries, with 
developing countries showing a larger correlation. Dedrick et al. (2013) also found a 
significant and stronger correlation on productivity in developing countries between 1994 and 
2007. However, data availability is still an issue. A lack of data on IT capital in low-income 
countries makes the relationship difficult to study (ibid. 2013).  
3.3.2 ICT adoption and productivity 
This sub-section briefly summarises literature covering the relationship between ICT 
adoption and productivity. In a sample of 49,610 firms in 117 developing countries between 
2006 and 2011, Paunov and Rollo (2015) found widespread productivity gains for firms 
adopting the internet including firms facing electricity, financial and skill constraints, and 
dealing with corruption and heavy labour regulations, although to a lesser extent than firms 
not facing constraints. Productivity and internet adoption were positively correlated in all 
world regions except for Pacific and South Asia. The McKinsey Global Institute (2011) 
suggests that firms with online presences grow two times as fast and export twice as much 
as offline firms. Moreover, businesses allocating 30 per cent of their budget or greater to 
web technologies increased revenues nine-fold compared to firms spending under 10 per 
cent. The internet as a GPT seems to have impacts on many sectors. Three-quarters of the 
value created by the internet is captured by firms that do not consider themselves as tech 
companies (ibid. 2011).  
3.3.3 Heterogeneity in productivity gains for firms 
The two previous sub-sections looked at productivity gains at aggregate levels. This sub-
section covers differences in productivity gains for firms of different types. The use of the 
internet for productive purposes by firms and the intensity of its use is highly heterogeneous 
and varies by country, region, within countries, and between sectors and firms. Firms at all 
country income levels are more likely to use email than have a website, and are more likely 
to have a website than buy or sell goods online. But firms in high-income countries are more 
likely to do all those things than those in low-income countries (World Bank 2016). Although 
most firms in high-income economies have embraced PCs and the internet, other business-
related digital technologies have not diffused as ubiquitously. Less than 20 per cent and 
approximately 15 per cent of firms in developed countries have adopted cloud computing 
and e-sales on average respectively. A Dalberg (2013b) study showed that businesses 
across four African countries are more likely to use the internet to conduct research but 
much less likely to use management applications or to recruit employees on the internet.  
 
Firms within industries also use ICTs differently depending on geographic location, industry 
and orientation. Dalberg (2013b) finds that in four African countries, international companies 
were most likely to see web applications as useful followed by national and local companies 
respectively. Exporting SMEs in the agricultural sector were more likely to use the internet 
for marketing purposes than non-exporters (ibid. 2013b). Although only 25 per cent of 
Indonesian firms in the textile sector used the internet for communication, nearly 100 per 
cent of them do in Peru (Paunov and Rollo 2014). A survey of 1,300 businesses in seven 
sectors across four African countries shows that although the education sector used the 
internet least to manage customer relationships, supply chains or internal organisations, they 
instead used it more heavily than other sectors to conduct research, store data and for 
education/training purposes. Although the financial services sector was the most likely to use 
the internet to provide a product or service, recruit workers, and manage client relationships 
and the internal organisation, it was also the least likely sector to use the internet to conduct 
research (Dalberg 2013b). The figure below breaks down usage of the internet by firms to 
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perform different tasks by sector. Overall, SMEs were most likely to use the internet to 
manage customer relationships, conduct research, manage the supply chain, etc., 
suggesting that the internet does indeed provide SMEs with value. MGI (2015) finds 
disparities in internet use and gains between sectors in the US and shows that these 
disparities have been increasing over time between and within industries. This relationship 
has not been looked at in developing countries. 
Table 3.1 Firm use of the internet by sector in four African countries (by 
percentage) 
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Agriculture 72 70 53 49 43 38 23 18 
Health 67 61 50 58 48 53 38 18 
Education 81 45 22 68 84 34 43 24 
Financial services 61 74 26 65 40 63 49 39 
Energy and transport 65 73 54 57 42 41 42 30 
Governance 63 54 22 50 53 56 34 32 
SMEs* 99 89 58 86 74 61 62 31 
 
Note: * Calculated using data provided in Dalberg (2013b: 39). 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from Dalberg (2013b). 
 
Firms in different cities of the same country also experience ICTs differently. Firms in Ireland 
are more likely to adopt ICT in the capital city (Haller and Siedschlag 2011). Iacovone et al. 
(2015) find that Mexican companies are more likely to effectively adopt digital technologies if 
they face competition in Mexico or the US from Chinese firms, signalling that competition is a 
key driver of ICT adoption. MGI (2012) also finds a positive correlation between market 
competitiveness and higher productivity gains from the internet.  
3.4 Spillover effects 
This sub-section concerns literature on (positive) externalities of widespread ICT adoption on 
firms that have not adopted ICTs. Paunov and Rollo (2014) show that widespread adoption 
of the internet within an industry may have positive spillover effects on firms that don’t use 
the internet in those industries, meaning that the impact of the internet seems to go beyond 
those that adopt it when uptake is high within an industry. The biggest spillover beneficiaries 
seem to be firms lacking strong knowledge networks prior to widespread adoption, including 
single-plant firms, non-exporters and firms operating in remote areas. Firms that export are 
less likely to benefit from these spillovers because they already have access to external 
contacts and expertise. There was no evidence that smaller firms disproportionately 
benefited from knowledge spillovers compared to bigger ones. According to Paunov and 
Rollo, there are several avenues for knowledge spillovers including recruiting new staff, 
business association meetings and face-to-face contact with other firms in the industry, 
competitors and customers. They argue that knowledge spillover could pave the way for 
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more inclusive innovation but only if firms have the absorptive capacity to make use of the 
knowledge. At the micro level, Jensen (2007) found that market efficiency gains from mobile 
phones spilled over to fishermen who didn’t use mobile phones in the form of higher 
earnings.  
 
Box 3.2  Innovation at the bottom of the pyramid 
Many mobile innovations have taken root with users in developing countries, including multi-SIM 
card phones and mobile money (World Bank 2012; Mehta 2013). The missed call (when a caller 
rings once then ends the call, allowing the person receiving the call to get a predetermined 
message despite no actual textual or audio communication) has become a common use in 
developing countries which was not intended by mobile designers (Hamade 2012; Mpogole et al. 
2008; Mehta 2013). Locally designed applications and platforms that take into account context 
specificity are more likely to address development challenges (World Bank 2012).  
 
Martin and Abbott (2011) found that farmers in Uganda’s Kamuli district came up with unique 
productive uses for mobile devices tailored to their needs that were not intended by the designers 
and developers of the phones. Some of these unique uses include using speakerphone for group 
consultations, documenting demonstrations and lessons through photos and audio recordings, 
recording market trends in the calendar, documenting contractual agreements in audio, and using 
the calculator function for pricing decisions (ibid. 2011). These uses usually develop over time as 
users become familiar with the technology. At adoption farmers in rural Uganda engaged in an 
average of 1.75 different uses for mobile phones but this increased to 5.16 over time as farmers 
began developing their own innovative uses to deal with changing needs.   
 
There are also examples of the poor taking advantage of mobile technology to develop new 
business models. For example, micro-entrepreneurs in India have begun charging phones through 
solar panels and some street-hackers have altered phones to take multiple SIM cards (Mehta 
2013). The SIM card innovation was so transformative that manufacturers have begun offering 
phones with multiple SIM-slots. Moreover, Rutten and Mwangi (2012) suggest that Safaricom and 
DFID originally intended M-Pesa to be used solely as a payment tool for microfinance and that it 
was when local people began appropriating it to their own needs that Safaricom noticed it had the 
potential to be something more. Rather than treating the poor as passive beneficiaries of digital 
development programmes and policy, more work is needed to understand how they make digital 
technology work for them.   
 
3.5 Productivity gains of micro-entrepreneurs  
3.5.1 Studies focusing on micro-entrepreneurs  
While there are few studies that focus on the impact of ICTs on SMEs in developing 
countries, there are even fewer studies on micro-entrepreneurs (Makoza and Chigona 
2012). This sub-section briefly summarises such literature. The literature suggests that in 
some contexts micro-entrepreneurs benefit from ICTs. Three commonly cited productive 
uses of mobile phones by micro-entrepreneurs include: accessing information that aids 
decision-making; increasing efficiency of coordination; and improving social capital and 
networking opportunities (Martin and Abbott 2011). The use of mobile phones is correlated 
with the increases in income for potato farmers in India by 19 per cent, grain traders in Niger 
by 29 per cent, and banana farmers in Uganda by 36 per cent (World Bank 2012). Mobile 
phones were associated with an 8 per cent increase in profits for fishermen and a 4 per cent 
decrease in price for consumers plus an increase in sardine consumption of 6 per cent 
(Jensen 2007). Furthermore, although mostly larger commercial fishermen adopted mobile 
phones, there were gains by non-users suggesting that mobile phones made the market 
function better overall. 
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In a survey of micro-enterprises in rural Kenya, about 90 per cent of respondents believed 
that mobile phones helped their micro-enterprise grow, and about half of micro-
entrepreneurs believed that mobile phones helped them obtain new clients, decreased the 
time required to make business arrangements, avoid middlemen, get better information 
about the products and services they sold, and that mobile money has a positive and 
significant influence on income growth (Mwangi and Acosta 2013). Chew et al. (2011) shows 
that there is a significant but limited positive causal relationship between ICT access and 
business growth for micro-entrepreneurs. Mobile phones were able to explain only 2 per cent 
of variance in business growth. However, there is little evidence that computers have a 
positive impact on micro-entrepreneurs due to low computer and internet diffusion.  
 
Ownership of a mobile device is insufficient in itself for micro-entrepreneurs to reap 
economic benefits from ICT. ICT use by micro-entrepreneurs is often limited to simple 
technologies such as mobile phones (Martin and Abbott 2011). Beyond issues of ownership, 
perceived usefulness, awareness of ICT uses for business activities and a lack of relevant 
skills tend to be a barrier for micro-enterprises. A lack of awareness can lead micro-
entrepreneurs who own ICTs to not use them for business purposes. For example, although 
hotlines for expert advice are often made available by donors and governments, a lack of 
knowledge of these services limits their uptake (ibid. 2011). A survey of rural India found that 
only one-fifth of mobile phone users used their phones for economic purposes including 
accessing market information, seeking employment opportunities, trading and credit. The 
lack of use of mobile phones for economic activity is especially low for subsistence farmers, 
who may see less value in using ICTs compared to commercial farmers (Mehta 2013). One 
widely cited way in which micro-entrepreneurs have benefited from ICTs is through 
overcoming information asymmetries.  
3.5.2 Information asymmetries  
This sub-section covers literature concerning the ability of digital technologies to overcome 
information asymmetries. The literature suggests that overcoming information asymmetries 
has a greater impact on rural areas where a lack of landlines, reliance on intermediaries and 
longer distances have traditionally made the flow of information costlier (Klonner and Nolen 
2008). In many developing country markets information is often imperfect and limited, with 
economic agents typically knowing prices in only a few nearby villages or towns. Information 
asymmetries can make trade slow, costly and risky, constraining the development of 
markets because gathering information often requires physical interaction, with the potential 
that economic agents may take journeys only to find empty markets upon arrival. 
Furthermore, traders with more information are able to engage in opportunistic behaviour 
when they are aware of their advantage (ibid. 2008; Jensen 2007). Markets that operate 
despite information asymmetries tend to be localised and reliant on intermediaries.  
 
The literature suggests that mobile phones can help overcome information asymmetries 
before, during and after trades (Jagun et al. 2008; Boateng et al. 2014). Before trades, 
mobile phones allow economic agents to access market information. During trades, ICTs 
allow them to access information vital to negotiation. After trade, economic agents can follow 
up and maintain relationships with clients. Where mobile phones overcome information 
asymmetries, the literature suggests that they are capable of increasing market efficiency, 
reducing intermediaries, reducing price and wage dispersion, cutting costs associated with 
getting information and saving time and money through journey substitution.   
 
A widely cited Jensen (2007) study found that mobile phone adoption was correlated with 
significant decreases in price dispersion, nearing the law of one price in Kerala’s fish market 
and the elimination of waste. Jensen argues that mobile phones were commonly used to 
gather information on price and thus decide where and from whom to buy and sell. Although 
its findings are contested, Jensen’s study is often generalised at a global scale in the ICT4D 
22 
 
(Information and Communication Technologies for Development) literature to advocate for 
Market Information Systems (MIS) and to argue that mobile phones would provide users 
around the world with access to price information (Burrell and Oreglia 2015). Metha (2013) 
also found that mobile phones were associated with a decrease in price dispersion and 
spoilage for farmers in rural India. Aker (2008) finds that mobile phone roll-out is associated 
with a 20 per cent decrease in price differentials in Niger’s grain markets with greater 
impacts between markets further away from each other and those connected by 
substandard roads. Mobile phones were also shown to decrease intra-annual variation, 
helping stabilise grain prices. Moreover, Mehta (2013) suggests that mobile phones 
decreased the dispersion of wages between rural Indian markets. Not all studies find that the 
phone reduced price dispersion or wages. For example, Jagun et al. (2008) did not find that 
mobile phones affected the price of traditional cloth in Nigeria. Thus, price dispersion does 
not come automatically with the roll-out of mobile coverage.  
 
Moreover, several studies including Burrell and Oreglia (2015), Srinivasan and Burrell 
(2013), and Steyn and Das (2015) have refuted Jensen’s claims about the use of mobile 
phones to access price information. These studies expanded on Jensen’s purely economic 
study to include ethnographies of fishers and farmers in Kerala (Srinivasan and Burrell 2015; 
Steyn and Das 2015) and in Uganda and China (Burrell and Oreglia 2015), which shed light 
on how these economic agents used mobile phones and what capabilities of mobile phones 
they found to be valuable. None of the fishers interviewed by Steyn and Das (2015) claimed 
that they used mobile phones to access market price information. Srinivasan and Burrell 
(2015) and Burrell and Oreglia (2015) also found that their interviewees generally did not 
access price information via mobile phone. In many instances, mechanisms were already in 
place to access price information including but not limited to television, radio, extension 
agents and word of mouth. Moreover, not all economic agents are able to act upon price 
information equally. In some cases, the cost of fuel and transport is a barrier to accessing 
better prices in foreign markets. In other cases, relationships with financers and debt 
collectors hinder fishers and farmers in selling their goods in other markets. Steyn and Das 
(2015) found that rather than helping fishers determine where to dock, the mobile phone was 
mostly used to relay messages about when to dock. It is more profitable to dock during busy 
hours when fishers can demand higher prices in their home landing site. Moreover, 
economic agents don’t always act in an individualistic manner, but are often part of 
expansive networks of stakeholders with players in many different roles. In many cases, 
fishers and farmers will choose to stick with the relationships they have built over time and 
networks that they are familiar with in order to minimise risk and uncertainty (Steyn and Das 
2015).  
 
Some argue that mobile phones enable disintermediation (Heeks 2014; Mehta 2013; 
Rahman et al. 2013). Although intermediaries do help overcome information asymmetries in 
the absence of accessible information, they also tend to have a highly unequal relationship 
with buyers and sellers that can lead to exploitative or opportunistic behaviour by 
intermediaries. For example, since traditional Nigerian clothing is only purchased for special 
occasions and weavers and buyers are unable to find each other on their own, 
intermediaries commonly overprice garments and use lower-quality materials than promised. 
Knowledge of such behaviour can further undermine the reputation and trust of entire 
sectors (Jagun et al. 2008). In the Nigerian traditional clothing case, the introduction of 
mobile phones actually further entrenched intermediaries, exacerbated unequal relationships 
between intermediaries who had mobile phones and weavers, led to weavers without mobile 
phones losing orders to weavers with mobile phones, and even engendered a new type of 
intermediary.  
 
Where phone calls and texts can substitute journeys, they save time and money because 
phone calls lasting a few minutes tend to be cheaper than transportation, and they also save 
opportunity costs (Aker 2008; Jagun et al. 2008; Mpogole et al. 2008; Chew et al. 2011; 
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Katengeza et al. 2014; Rahman et al. 2013). In Kerala, distances between fishers and 
markets are often large. Fishers are typically able to travel to one or a few markets a day, 
making the opportunity cost of arriving at an empty or over-saturated market very high 
(Jensen 2007). Market inefficiencies are especially apparent when excess supply leads to 
the spoilage of perishables in one market while excess buyers are unable to purchase 
anything in nearby markets. Phone calls decrease the likelihood that traders will not find 
someone to transact with. The introduction of mobile phones in Kerala, India was correlated 
with a complete elimination of waste (ibid. 2007). Although some journeys can be 
substituted, some journeys still remain important especially when a lack of trust persists, 
materials or end products need to be picked up, instructions are not easily conveyed over 
phones, or there is a need to monitor quality (Jagun et al. 2008). 
 
In Malawi, ICT-enabled Market Information Services help economic agents perform activities 
faster, promote competition, reduce transaction costs, improve market performance, and 
improve agricultural incomes (Katengeza et al. 2014). Although donors and governments 
often establish agencies that provide services related to market information, training and 
access to experts, many economic agents remain unable to benefit from them because of a 
lack of awareness that they exist (Makoza and Chingona 2012; Martin and Abbott 2011; 
Mehta 2013).  
 
Mobile phones have been praised for helping economic agents maintain their business 
networks (Aker 2008; Jagun et al. 2008; Hamade 2012; among others). However, social 
factors such as gender influence the extent to which mobile phones can improve networks. 
Martin and Abbott (2011) found that more men were likely to perceive mobile phones as a 
tool to increase their social network than women in the Kamuli district of Uganda because 
men tend to be more mobile while women tend to stay at home. This example and the 
example of the Nigerian traditional cloth sector show that contextual factors have an impact 
on mobile phones’ ability to overcome information asymmetries.  
3.6 Complements needed to increase productivity 
The literature does not always imply that the productivity gains are automatic. This sub-
section covers complementary factors needed to increase productivity. Digital technology 
can have a negative or no impact on productivity if workers do not have the right skills and if 
firms do not undergo organisational restructuring processes to make efficient use of the 
technologies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). Firms in Brazil 
saw significant productivity increases only after they flattened their organisational structures 
(Commander et al. 2011; World Bank 2016). The flattening of organisations requires 
allowing workers greater autonomy while also reducing the responsibility of managers and 
controllers – something that can prove difficult in developed countries and even more difficult 
in developing countries (Niebel 2014). The World Bank reports that only a quarter of firms 
that use ICTs have reinvented their organisational structures, meaning most firms are likely 
to be underusing their digital resources (World Bank 2016). Dedrick et al. (2013) argue that 
productivity gains from ICT investment depend on ‘human resources, openness to foreign 
investment, cost of service, and the quality of infrastructure’. Higher returns to IT investment 
occurred in firms with greater IT skills and access to good telecommunications infrastructure, 
cheaper internet prices and greater inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from IT-
intensive countries. Furthermore, the fact that it took developing countries longer to achieve 
productivity gains from ICTs suggests that there may be a minimum threshold of adoption to 
reach network effects, and of experience and learning before countries can expect to see 
tangible returns to ICT investments (ibid. 2013). The minimum threshold has been referred 
to in multiple studies looking at the relationships between both ICTs and economic growth 
and ICTs and productivity, meaning that there are potentially network effects to higher 
penetration rates (Röller and Waverman 2001; Minges 2015).  
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Furthermore, the literature suggests that there are often lags between ICT adoption and 
productivity gains. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) found that computerisation investments led to 
output and productivity growth in the short term, but even larger returns over the long run. It 
generally takes organisations time – sometimes years – to restructure their organisational 
structures and make other complementary investments and innovations, such as new 
management processes and ways to interact with customers and suppliers to take full 
advantage of ICTs (ibid. 2003). Similarly, a study of Italian SMEs showed that broadband 
adoption can have a negative effect on firm productivity unless they adopt broadband 
applications relevant to their operations and make appropriate organisational structural 
changes (Colombo et al. 2013). Beyond one-time structural changes, Haltiwanger et al. 
(2003) attributes the greater productivity of foreign American firms operating in Europe to 
higher levels of experimentation.  
 
However, there seems to be a revolving door as the most productive firms are the ones most 
likely to have the absorptive capacity to adopt productive technologies, spurring a similar 
question to the literature on economic growth (Paunov and Rollo 2015). Is digital technology 
causing productivity gains or are productivity gains causing digital technology diffusion – or 
neither? According to the World Development Report (2016), 
 
A positive productivity correlation in the data might simply capture that more 
productive firms use digital technology more effectively, indicating that other 
potentially unobservable firm-specific factors explain the positive correlation between 
digital technologies and firm productivity. 
(World Bank 2016: 56).  
 
It is possible that the internet is most likely adopted in more affluent countries and regions to 
begin with, thus leading to endogeneity – the possibility that increases in productivity and 
internet penetration cause each other or that a third variable causes both of them (Czernich 
et al. 2009). 
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4 Employment 
4.1 Current and future trends of employment and technological 
change 
The effects of digital technology on (un)employment has been the topic of much debate. This 
section reviews such debates and the evidence that underpins it. MGI (2012) suggests that 
the internet is a net job creator in both developing and developed countries. Furthermore, 
MGI suggests that it is a disproportionately greater job creator in its list of 30 ‘aspiring’ 
developing countries than in developed countries, creating 3.2 and 1.6 jobs per job 
displaced in aspiring and developed countries respectively. In Ecuador, every 1 per cent 
increase in broadband penetration was shown to correlate with employment rate growth of 
0.056 percentage points (pp) and an unemployment rate reduction of 0.105 per cent, 
suggesting that the internet generated 85,000 jobs in 2012 alone (Katz and Callorda 2013). 
Klonner and Nolen (2008) found that the expansion of network coverage is associated with a 
15 per cent increase in employment in rural South Africa, with the majority of the 
employment gains experienced by women – every 10pp increase in internet penetration 
makes women 4.5pp more likely to be formally employed. Although mobile network 
expansion did not affect male employment rates overall, it led to a sectorial shift away from 
agriculture making room for women to do those jobs (ibid. 2008). Furthermore, Beard et al. 
(2010) show that internet users are less likely to give up on the job search than non-internet 
users in the US.  
 
However, recent studies warn that automation-facilitated job displacement rates are 
expected to accelerate over the next decade (World Bank 2016; MGI 2015; Autor 2014; 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; among others). These warnings persist for both developed 
and developing countries as shown in the World Development Report (2016). Fears of 
technology displacing workers are not novel. The first instance occurred in nineteenth-
century England when the Luddites protested, rebelled and rioted against the machines and 
the low-skilled low-wage labour that replaced them during the second industrial revolution. 
Electrification spurred similar despair for John Maynard Keynes in 1931 and so did 
automation for Isaac Asimov in 1964. Some scholars argue that the fear is misplaced due to 
society’s innate ability to correct the social ills of technological progress in the long run 
(Davenport and Kirby 2015; Autor et al. 2003). Others argue that this time is different 
because contemporary technological advancements are happening at an accelerating rate 
and while previous technology-led job displacement affected labour in only a few 
occupations or sectors, this time technology is permeating into almost all sectors and 
occupations (World Bank 2016; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Cowen 2013; among 
others).  
 
Davenport and Kirby (2015) categorise periods of automation into three eras:  
 
 Era 1 [nineteenth century] when machines replaced dirty and dangerous labour  
 Era 2 [twentieth century] when machines replaced dull repetitive work  
 Era 3 [twenty-first century] where machines are replacing work related to decision-
making.  
 
Indeed, today the threat of automation is not one of simply automating routine non-cognitive 
tasks as it was in the past. Advancements in cognitive computing and artificial intelligence 
have begun performing tasks that were once believed to be unique to humans. Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee project:  
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Technological progress is going to leave behind some people, perhaps even a lot of 
people, as it races ahead... There’s never been a better time to be a worker with 
special skills or the right education… However, there’s never been a worst time to be 
a worker with only ordinary skills and abilities to offer because computers, robots, 
and other digital technologies are acquiring these skills and abilities at an 
extraordinary rate. 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014: 11)  
 
Most scholars seem to agree with Brynjolfsson and McAfee that in the short and medium 
term technological advancements will lead to an unprecedented displacement of workers. 
Where scholars tend to diverge is in their projections of what employment will look like in the 
long run. Kelly (2012) and Autor (2014) – probably among the most optimistic – argue that, 
just as farmers in the 1800s would have a hard time believing that the majority of the 
workforce is not working in agriculture today or imagining the type of work done in 
contemporary society, we are currently going through a similar struggle with automation – 
we can’t imagine what kind of work humans will be doing 100 years from now. Other 
optimists such as Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) argue that we can counter these effects if 
we learn to ‘race with the machines’ rather than against them. They emphasise that until the 
foreseeable future, computers will only be good at executing whatever they are programmed 
to do. Areas where humans are likely to maintain a significant advantage over computers are 
ideation, creativity and entrepreneurship. Algorithms are currently not capable of telling a 
good joke or writing beautiful sonnets. Proponents of this view often refer to a historic free-
style chess competition between teams consisting of any combination of human and central 
processing unit (CPU) players. Teams consisting of both humans and computers were 
always superior to computers or humans on their own. At the end, a team of two novice 
human players and three weak computers ended up winning the competition, showing that 
weak humans and weak machines using better processes are superior to expert humans 
using powerful machines and an inferior process (ibid. 2014). 
 
A similar view is held by Davenport and Kirby (2015). To them the way forward is a relay 
race where teams of humans and computers pass the baton back and forth through a 
process of ‘augmentation’ in which both machines and humans add value to each other’s 
work. For this narrative to unfold, many efficiency-minded organisations will have to drop the 
idea that humans and machines substitute each other depending on costs. They underscore 
five ways that individuals may augment technology:  
 
 Where machines do lower-level tasks while humans focus on higher order abstract 
concerns 
 Gaining tacit knowledge that cannot be codified and replicated by computers  
 Becoming a programmer who can fix mechanical issues and step in when machines 
go wrong  
 Specialising in a very narrow topic that would not be economical to automate; and  
 Becoming a designer, constructor, investor and builder of new automation 
technologies.  
 
One setback of Davenport and Kelly’s (2015) augmentation techniques is that they seem to 
require a high level of skill – and potentially education – that put such techniques and ‘racing 
with the machines’ techniques beyond the reach of the poor and marginalised (Cowen 
2013). In his book, Average is Over, Tyler Cowen (2013) projects a future dominated by a 
small wealthy elite coexisting with a mass body of poor people. In his projection only a small 
group of winners – 15 per cent of the population – which he calls the ‘hyper-productive’, will 
be able to ‘race with the machines’ or manage and market people who do. Cowen claims 
that income polarisation exacerbated by automation will lead to the disappearance of ‘the 
average person’ as it had already began to do so in the post-recession job market. Then, the 
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US and other advanced economies saw a hollowing out of the middle class, with higher 
earnings going to people able to leverage new technologies, and lower earnings to those 
unable to adapt to them. Cowen argues that today and increasingly in the future not having 
the right training or profile will shut people out of employment opportunities.  
 
Similarly, another future of work pessimist, the former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence 
Summers (2014) says that ‘the economic challenge of the future will not be producing 
enough. It will be providing enough good jobs’. He also compares what is happening today 
to what happened with agriculture production over the past century but he comes to a 
different conclusion. Agriculture employed 85 per cent of the global workforce in 1800 but 
only 33.5 per cent in 2010 and as low as 5 and 2 per cent in the OECD and US/UK 
respectively. Today, the pace of technological acceleration makes Summers and others 
sceptical about society’s ability to produce good jobs at the rate that they are being 
displaced. He further warns that while this is happening, 3-D printing, robotics, voice-
automated technologies, driverless cars, algorithms that write news stories, etc. are still in 
their infancy and will likely further disrupt employment. To sum up his fears: 
 
This time around, change will be faster and affect a much larger share of the 
economy. Workers leaving agriculture could move into a wide range of jobs in 
manufacturing or services. Today, however, there are more sectors losing jobs than 
creating jobs. And the general-purpose aspect of software technology means that 
even the industries and jobs that it creates are not forever. 
(Summers 2014) 
 
The debate on the implications of technological advance on employment is mostly western-
centred. The most recent World Development Report (2016) suggests that there is also 
reason to be pessimistic about technological advance in developing countries. ‘From a 
technological standpoint, two-thirds of all jobs are susceptible to automation in the 
developing world, but the effects are moderated by lower wages and slower technology 
adoption’ (World Bank 2016: 129). However, increasing wages and the increasing rate of 
technology adoption make automation a probable issue in the long run. Although fewer jobs 
– 50 to 60 per cent – are susceptible to automation in the US, Europe and other advanced 
economies, the threat there is worse because wages and technological adaptation are 
higher, making automation more economical and easier (ibid. 2016). This gives developing 
countries more time to put in place policies to mitigate the risks associated with automation 
and to prepare their people for the future of work. However, this trend is not found in all 
countries. For example, China has experienced an increase in routine employment due to 
the mechanisation of agriculture. Many countries in Latin America have also not seen an 
increase in routine work thanks to a commodity-driven boom that has placed a high demand 
on low-skilled labour (ibid. 2016). 
4.2 Employment on the internet  
4.2.1 Online outsourcing  
The internet has brought with it a new wave of outsourcing which has been identified as a 
big opportunity for employment in developing countries. Online Outsourcing (OO) is defined 
as ‘the contracting of third party workers and providers – often overseas – to supply services 
or perform tasks via internet-based marketplaces or platforms’ (World Bank 2015: 1). There 
are two common forms of online outsourcing. Microwork involves tasks requiring basic 
numeracy, literacy and digital skills that can easily be broken down into smaller tasks and 
completed within hours or days. Barriers to entry for microwork are low and workers are paid 
low wages in comparison to online freelancing. Online freelancing is the contracting of 
individuals with professional or technical skills via the internet to perform large projects over 
an extended period of time – sometimes months.  
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Individuals performing microwork and freelancers often find their work on online platforms 
such as Upwork, Amazon Mechanical Turk and Crowdflower. For both microworkers and 
freelancers, there are two primary archetypes of platforms to find work. Open services 
platforms allow employers and employees to negotiate directly. Managed services platforms 
act as intermediaries between employees and employers, often in a physical location, and 
provide employees with counselling and training, and quality control for clients. It has been 
widely noted that workers in the OO sphere often lack the benefits and safety nets that 
typically come with formal employment – at least in developed countries – including 
severance pay, unemployment benefits and health insurance (Dalberg 2013a; World Bank 
2016, 2015). Furthermore, there are some significant biases and inequalities between users 
who can and cannot get OO work. Most of the work comes from four anglophone countries, 
meaning that mostly English speakers can exploit this work. There is also a gender bias, 
with men more likely to work in OO than women. Furthermore, significant knowledge and 
skills usually associated with a tertiary education are required for freelancing, which is 
substantially higher paid than microwork (ibid. 2015).  
4.2.2 Impact outsourcing  
The Rockefeller Foundation, Dalberg (2013a) and the World Bank (2015) have been pushing 
the idea of impact outsourcing. Impact outsourcing initiatives seek to ‘build BPO [Business 
Process Outsourcing] businesses that target historically disadvantaged individuals for 
employment’ (Dahlberg 2013a: 4). These businesses would fall under the managed services 
OO platforms because intermediary companies such as Samasource hire, train, console and 
manage promising disadvantaged youths in-house. According to Dahlberg, these jobs are 
capable of transforming the lives of marginalised youths and their families because wages 
are typically 40 to 200 per cent greater than what they could receive elsewhere and these 
opportunities provide them with the skills and experience necessary to gain future 
employment and schooling.  
 
Dahlberg (2013a) mentions that youths employed through these schemes are likely to be 
high school and university graduates from marginalised neighbourhoods or backgrounds 
who lack the functional and behavioural skills to enter the formal workforce. However, given 
that these ‘marginalised youths’ have been able to obtain a formal secondary and/or tertiary 
education, they are by definition not the most disadvantaged. There are still literacy and 
educational barriers to participating in the scheme, which leaves out the most disadvantaged 
and vulnerable. There is also doubt whether these jobs are likely to provide sustainable 
employment since the jobs created are routine, low-skilled, call-centre type jobs. These 
kinds of jobs are currently susceptible to automation. Impact outsourcing relies on large 
multinationals looking to cut costs by hiring low-wage labour and at the same time make an 
impact on the lives of marginalised youths. However, as Brynjolfsson et al. (2014) warn:  
 
The growing capabilities of automation threaten one of the most reliable strategies 
that poor countries have used to attract outside investment: offering low wages to 
compensate for low productivity and skill levels. And the trend will extend beyond 
manufacturing. Interactive voice response systems, for example, are reducing the 
requirement for direct person-to-person interaction, spelling trouble for call centers in 
the developing world… In more and more domains, the most cost-effective source of 
‘labor’ is becoming intelligent and flexible machines as opposed to low-wage humans 
in other countries.  
(Brynjolfsson et al. (2014) 
 
Kelly (2012) also makes similar projections, claiming that offshoring is only the first step to 
robotisation because over time robots become cheaper than human labour abroad. There is 
also the potential threat of sequential offshoring common in manufacturing in which as 
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wages rise in one country, operations are moved to another country with lower wages to 
keep costs down, creating a ‘race to the bottom’ where countries compete for limited 
employment opportunities by lowering wages and taxes (World Bank 2015). Furthermore, it 
is unlikely that impact outsourcing will help participants develop digital content creation skills 
given that these job placements mainly focus on using ICTs to service the clients of 
multinationals. SMEs are more likely to outsource complex functions when they don’t have 
those capabilities in-house through freelancing and they make up 80 per cent of freelance 
contractors. Multinationals on the other hand, are less likely to outsource complex functions 
and more likely to outsource lower functions in the value chain through microwork (World 
Bank 2015). As projected by the future of employment optimists and pessimists alike, the 
biggest winners in the future are likely to be those able to use the technologies to augment 
their abilities or who have the capacity to create new ones – not those susceptible to being 
substituted by automation. Just because an occupation utilises ICT does not make it 
irreplaceable by ICT. In fact, some tasks that heavily required the use of computers and ICT 
in the past such as travel agents have nearly disappeared due to automation (Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee 2014). 
 
Box 4.1 Assessing ‘digital job’ impact outsourcing using value chain, 
middle-income trap, and economic complexity literature 
Although the middle-income trap literature has mainly focused on the production of physical goods, 
it may provide some lessons for service jobs based on ICT. Because the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Digital Jobs Africa initiative focuses mainly on the use of managed services platforms that connect 
multinationals to local marginalised youths, it is unlikely that these youths will be performing high-
value functions, making them unlikely to develop the ‘know-how’ needed to innovate, design or 
generate content using ICT. Firms in the Brazilian shoe industry overcame this issue by creating 
parallel national and regional value chains that do not threaten the foreign lead firm’s markets. This 
allows the local firms to begin experimenting and developing higher-level functions while 
maintaining their relationship with the foreign firm. Maintaining the relationship with the global lead 
firm allows them to continue learning from them and provides the local firm with a finance stream 
for other activities (Navas-Alemán 2011). There seems to be nothing of this nature on the Digital 
Jobs Africa agenda, but it may be worthwhile seeing how these call centres can become a gateway 
for local innovation and design capability building.  
 
Economic complexity theory is another potential point of reference for impact outsourcing efforts. 
This theory has recently gained traction because it has proven to be a far better predictor of 
economic growth than other predictors including measures of governance and institutional quality, 
measures of human capital, and the global competitiveness index (Hausmann et al. 2014). It 
suggests that the economic growth of a society is contingent on the amount and diversity of its 
societal know-how – what it knows how to do – and the ability to bring these capabilities together 
through firms and ‘value networks’. The key to having a large amount of capabilities is to have a 
very diverse know-how dispersed among many individuals. Thus, it advocates a widespread 
acquirement of capabilities – as many as possible – and is thus in contradiction to previous 
economic theories advocating comparative advantage.  
 
The product-space is a centrepiece in complexity theory and maps all the products that an 
economy is able to produce, giving insight into which products a society may potentially produce 
based on similarities to products it already produces. Complex products are products that only a 
few countries are able to produce because they require a rare combination of many capabilities. 
Ubiquitous products are typically simple products that many countries produce and require very 
little know-how. Complex economies are those that are able to produce many products including a 
wide range of complex ones. According to Hidalgo and Hausman (2009), economies are most likely 
to grow when they have a lot of capabilities relative to their income level. This usually means that 
all potential capability combinations have not been fully exploited. To my knowledge, no work has 
been done on the relationship between the internet and economic complexity, or on whether the 
internet plays a role in adding new capabilities or bringing them together to expand the product 
space.  
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Complexity theory suggests that you could not cut and paste an entire industry into a country 
(Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009). If local digital know-how does not exist, then it is unlikely that a 
country, city or village will attract a multinational to outsource its digital jobs to it or to have the 
human resources needed to train employees to perform digital jobs, thus limiting the number of 
countries that could potentially attract such opportunities. Furthermore, if the prior obstacle is 
overcome, it is not safe to assume that increasing the service calling industry – a rather ubiquitous 
and simple industry – will automatically lead to the spurring of new jobs, firms and industries in 
more complex ICT functions and local content production unless young people are gradually 
encouraged and supported to develop ‘know-how’ well beyond that required in their positions.  
 
Having to depend on a multinational that is disconnected from the local setting and keeps its most 
profitable and higher value-added functions in-house is not likely to induce the development of 
skills associated with higher value functions. Locally sourced initiatives that seek to place 
marginalised youths with local tech organisations may be better placed to overcome these 
obstacles. For example, Laboratoria is a social enterprise that specifically trains the most 
disadvantaged group of Latin American youths – uneducated young women, many of whom don’t 
know what a web browser is before training – to become computer programmers (MIT Review 
2015). They graduate with advanced digital skills, including the ability to create content and 
platforms and thus higher value skills than those acquired by participants in Digital Jobs Africa. 
However, it is possible that a big part of Laboratoria’s viability is that it currently only operates in 
cities with booming tech sectors – Santiago, Lima and Mexico City – where they are able to pair 
their girls with local tech employers after graduation. 
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5 Inequality 
5.1 Inequality between users of digital technology 
Although the internet is often heralded as the great equaliser, it has left many behind in both 
developed and developing countries. More than 4 billion people currently lack access to the 
internet (World Bank 2016). Looking beyond aggregate numbers of access, digital inequality 
persists between those who are able to access the internet. In developed countries where 
digital technologies are near-ubiquitous, digital inequality is prevalent between the ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-mores’ (MGI 2015). The ‘haves’ have a tough time staying current with digital 
technologies while individuals, firms and sectors that ‘have-more’ operate at the frontier of 
digital technologies, are the first to reap benefits of new technologies and push the 
boundaries while capturing significant gains relative to the ‘haves’ in terms of market share 
and income growth (ibid. 2015).  
 
Given that internet penetration levels tend to be much lower in developing countries, 
developing countries generally confront a double issue. People within developing countries 
face digital inequality between those who don’t have access to digital technology and those 
who do, as well as inequality between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-mores.’ For example, inequality 
between those who have no phone and those who do; between those with basic phones and 
owners of smartphones with more productive apps, functions and operating systems; 
between those who consume content and those who create content or new platforms; 
between those who have autonomy over their access and those who access digital 
technology via shared means; between those who live in areas with good signal coverage 
and those who live beyond the reach of the internet. Furthermore, digital inequalities often 
mirror analogue ones. This literature review is concerned with economic inequality 
exacerbated by digital technology. For a quick overview on how users experience digital 
inequalities see Ramalingam and Hernandez (2016).  
5.2 Inequality exacerbated by digital technology in developed 
countries 
Although countries seem to be converging in terms of GDP per capita in the last few 
decades, within-country inequality has been on the rise (Moore and Justino 2015). Inequality 
in this literature review refers to within-country inequalities rather than inequalities between 
countries. In their seminal book The Second Machine Age, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) 
make a compelling case for how advancement in digital technology is the major driver of 
increasing ‘the spread’ – inequality – within developed countries today. They uncover four 
mechanisms driving this phenomenon. 
 
Firstly, the digitalisation of analogue functions can lead to the establishment of companies 
with a small number of very well paid employees displacing large analogue companies 
employing many middle-income workers. One extreme case is the one of Instagram 
compared to Kodak. Instagram – and other social media platforms – have become the major 
sharing points for photography. Facebook bought Instagram for US$1 billion despite 
employing only 13 people. Kodak on the other hand was once a key player in photo 
development but was unable to remain competitive with digital photography because of its 
better quality and the cost savings associated with not having to buy film or send photos to a 
lab, and the ability to make and share digital copies of photos at zero marginal cost 
instantaneously. ‘Photography is not an isolated example of this shift. Similar stories have 
been and will be told… in almost every industry’ (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014: 137). 
Developing algorithms and digital products that can replace analogue ones only requires a 
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small number of designers and can be replicated and distributed to millions of users at 
almost zero cost.  
 
Secondly, they argue that the Digital Revolution has created a set of disproportionate 
winners who have accumulated the right non-human and/or human capital. Individuals with 
the right accumulation of non-human capital include property owners (intellectual, 
equipment, financial assets, etc.) related to the production of digital technologies. People 
with the right accumulation of human capital include those with engineering, creative and 
design skills who have seen their demand increase through ‘skill-biased technical change’ in 
which the middle class has been hollowed out through the automation and decrease in 
demand of middle-skilled jobs while the demand for high-skilled labour has increased (ibid. 
2014). According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee, the biggest gap has occurred between the 
best in their fields – superstars – and all other workers. There has been an enormous 
widening between pay-outs to the top person in a field and the second best. Digital 
technology has led to both an increase in inequality between people at different ends of the 
income distribution and increasing inequality between those at the top of the income 
distribution and those at the very top. Today’s superstars are able ‘to leverage their talents 
via digitization and globalization’ to reach a massive audience through multiple channels and 
formats, something that historical superstars were unable to do (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014: 151). They argue that we are increasingly moving from skill-biased technological 
change to superstar-biased technological change in the global economy (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2014).  
 
Thirdly, digital technology leads to winner-takes-all – or in some cases winner-takes-most – 
markets when digital service providers are able to squeeze out the second best and all 
subsequent providers because consumers will generally choose the top-quality provider, all 
else being equal, especially if the product is free and available instantly. Today, digital 
service providers are able to overcome capacity and transportation constraints that limited 
market-share growth in the past through the use of cheaply replicated digital technology 
allowing them to deliver services at little or no marginal cost. Improvements in 
telecommunications and transportation – globalisation – make it easier for winners to 
increase their market-share and create a global market for their goods. Furthermore, when 
an app or digital service gains traction in terms of the number of users it has, it can achieve 
‘network effects’ – meaning that the app or digital service becomes more attractive and 
useful the more its user-base grows, further creating barriers to entry and potential lock-ins 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014).  
 
The fourth mechanism uncovered by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) is the evolving skillset 
that can be automated. The skillset susceptible to automation is dynamic and rapidly 
increasing, putting evermore employees at risk of being replaced by machines that can 
perform their jobs better and at lower cost. Automation has most rapidly replaced workers 
performing routine tasks regardless of whether these are manual or cognitive. Non-routine 
well-paid cognitive jobs – and even non-routine manual jobs – have held up relatively well. 
This leads to a polarisation of the workforce in which the demand and wages for workers in 
non-routine well-paid cognitive jobs are increasing while the demand and wages for workers 
performing routine tasks are decreasing.  
 
According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee, the aforementioned mechanisms have led to the 
‘great decoupling’ of productivity and median wages that persisted before the Digital 
Revolution. In the past, median wages and productivity rose accordingly. Today, although 
productivity and total wealth are increasing, the median workers’ income remains stagnant or 
is actually decreasing, leaving a majority of people worse off than they were before. ‘Fewer 
people are working, and wages for those who are working are lower than before. As a result, 
while labor compensation and productivity in the past rose in tandem, in recent years a gap 
has opened’ (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014: 145). Furthermore, Brynjolfsson et al. (2014) 
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suggest that this phenomenon is leading to a shift from bell-shaped – normal – income 
distribution to one that resembles a Pareto distribution or power-law distribution (see Figure 
5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Normal and power-law distributions 
 
Source: Adapted from Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). 
5.3 Inequality exacerbated by digital technology in developing 
countries 
Most of the literature concerning the effects of advancing digital technology on inequality – 
including Brynjolfsson and McAfee – tend to focus on developed countries (Autor 2014; 
Atkinson 2014; Atkinson 2015; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Cowen 2011; Cowen 2013; 
Gordon 2012; among others). There have been multiple books written about technology’s 
effect on the skills premium and inequality in developed countries in recent years. Yet 
literature of the same phenomenon in developing countries is scant. Just as there is reason 
to be pessimistic about the outlook of employment in developing countries, the World 
Development Report (World Bank 2016) and other studies give us reason to be pessimistic 
about the outlook for inequality in developing countries due to technological change. Since 
2000, the share of national income earned by workers has decreased in both developed and 
developing countries, driven primarily by a decreasing share of income earned by workers 
performing routine codifiable tasks. Thus, polarisation is also occurring in developing 
countries. 
 
The International Monetary Fund (2007) argued that although technological advancement 
has contributed to raising the incomes for all population segments in almost every region, it 
was also the biggest contributor to within-country inequality around the world between 1985 
and 2004. The study put technological advancement above other commonly cited inequality-
inducing mechanisms including trade and financial globalisation. The study also points to 
FDI as one of the driving forces behind increasing the skills premium and thus inequality. 
Inward FDI increases the demand for skilled labour in developing countries while outward 
FDI decreases the demand for relatively lower-skilled labour in developed countries. The 
study was carrying a strong narrative that although inequality was rising, most people were 
better off than before due to rising incomes all around.  
 
Recent literature, however, points in another direction – one in which technology is not lifting 
most boats and some are sinking. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) find that technological change is 
increasing the skills premium in both developed and developing countries and suggest that 
while globalisation further reinforces the skills premium in developed countries, financial 
deepening does so in developing ones. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) show that the 
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global share of wealth going to labour decreased between 1975 and 2012 in a majority (42) 
of the 52 countries they studied, including developing countries, despite increases in 
business earnings and corporate savings. They suggest that at least half of the observed 
decrease can be attributed to technological advancements lowering the price of investment 
[of machines] relative to labour, incentivising businesses to switch from human labour to 
capital. Brynjolfsson et al. (2014) use Apple operations in China as an example to illustrate 
how this is happening. Apple’s assembly company in China [Foxconn] heavily relies on low-
skilled labour to perform very repetitive tasks – e.g. combining two parts of a keyboard. 
Foxconn has already begun displacing these workers with robots. Although globalisation 
brought Apple manufacturing jobs to China due to low labour prices, these jobs are now 
being squeezed out by machines capable of doing the same work at a lower relative hourly 
rate without the need to take breaks or go home to sleep. However, how far advances in 
digital technology affect the skills premium is likely to vary from country to country. It is 
important to quantify the effects of digital technology on the skills premium in any given 
country. Knowing the extent of current and potential automation may put us in a better 
position for the next wave of automation.  
5.4 When does job polarisation occur? 
Recent evidence suggests that job polarisation may not happen gradually but in cyclical 
waves during recessions. In the US for example, most of the middle-skilled job loss – 88 per 
cent – in the last few decades occurred during or within 12 months of a recession (Jaimovich 
and Siu 2012, 2015). After recessions, aggregate employment has recovered much more 
slowly for routine middle-skilled jobs and much faster for non-routine low- and high-skilled 
occupations and aggregate output. The same phenomenon has been observed in western 
European and other developed countries (ibid. 2015; Gaggl and Kaufmann 2015), but has 
yet to be studied in developing countries. After recessions firms are more likely to seek 
candidates with more experience and higher levels of educational attainment. Upskilling and 
jobless recovery are most concentrated in routine jobs susceptible to being replaced by 
automation (Jaimovich and Siu 2015; Hershbein and Kahn 2016). Furthermore, firms that 
upskilled during the great recession were also most likely to invest in automation. One 
plausible explanation for investing in ICT capital for routine tasks during economic downturns 
is that purchasing ICT is relatively cheaper than re-hiring workers and is seen as a substitute 
for routine labour. On the other hand, a greater non-routine skill level is needed to 
complement the newly acquired digital technology, thus incentivising firms to keep and hire 
workers with non-routine skills (Gaggl and Kaufmann 2015).  
 
Increasing inequality and decreasing shares of labour can be problematic for economies. 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) find that in situations where the income share of the top 20 per 
cent increases by 1pp, GDP tends to decline by 0.08pp; when the income share of the 
bottom 20 per cent increases by 1pp, GDP tends to increase by 0.38pp. Thus, the economic 
empowerment of the poor seems to be more important for growth while increasing the share 
going to the rich stalls or reverses growth. Many others have argued that high inequality is 
bad for economic growth and the sustainability of growth (see section 3.1.2 in Moore and 
Justino 2015). High levels of inequality can negatively affect human capital, market efficiency 
and the middle class’s demand capacity, thus shrinking internal markets for manufactured 
and consumer goods. Furthermore, high levels of inequality are associated with many social 
ills including conflict, political instability, limited individual occupational and educational 
choices, bad health outcomes for the poor and a lack of social cohesion, limited social 
mobility and collective action (ibid. 2015).  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, skills-biased technological change has not occurred in 
every country. Where the demand for medium- and low-skilled labour has not increased, 
however, digital technology tends to have a ‘skills bias’ in which it increases the work 
prospects and wages of those with the skills to perform non-routine cognitive work while 
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replacing workers performing routine tasks. At the moment automation barely affects the 
work prospects and wages of non-routine low-skilled workers. However, many warn that in 
the long run as mid-level jobs in services continue to be automated and workers begin to 
swarm into non-routine low-skilled work – such as carpenters, hairdressers, gardeners, etc. 
– an oversupply of people willing to do these jobs will lead to a dip in wages for these 
occupations too (World Bank 2016; Summers 2014; Cowen 2013; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014; Autor 2014). The figure below illustrates projections for demand and earnings of 
different types of work in the future. Apart from being skills-biased, there is also evidence 
that the technological change is also age-, gender- and education-biased. The young, 
wealthy people, and men are more likely to be able to adapt to new technologies while the 
poor, older people and women are most likely to be left behind because they are less likely 
to have the complementary and ICT skills in demand (World Bank 2016). Furthermore, 
studies are showing a decrease in return to experience as skills for older – senior – workers 
are beginning to become obsolete, which will be especially challenging for countries with 
aging populations.  
Table 5.1 Expected impacts of technological change on employment and 
earnings 
Type of occupation (by skills intensity) Expected impact on 
Employment Earnings 
Non-routine cognitive Positive Positive 
Routine cognitive and manual Negative Negative 
Non-routine manual Positive Negative 
Source: World Bank (2016) based on Autor (2014) 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This review has summarised the evidence and key debates concerning the effects of digital 
technology on economic growth, productivity, employment and inequality. Although there are 
very well-established correlations between economic growth and ICT uptake – especially at 
the macro level – it remains inconclusive whether the internet causes growth or whether 
growth causes ICT uptake. The same can be said about the correlations between ICT 
uptake and productivity. Some reviews and reports claim that others have found a causal 
link between economic growth in contradiction to the original sources which clearly state that 
they have not been able to establish a causal relationship. The World Economic Forum 
(2015: 32) for example cites Minges (2015), Qiang et al. (2009) and Scott (2012) as studies 
‘demonstrating the causal impact of ICTs on growth’. However, the respective studies state 
the contrary. Qiang et al. were not able to prove causality using econometric tests and Scott 
(2012) did not have time to test causality, leading both studies as well as Minges (2015) to 
stress that causality is yet to be resolved. They all mention that it is still possible that 
economic growth causes internet penetration rather than the other way around, that they 
both cause each other simultaneously, that they may be caused by a third unobserved 
variable, or that the relationship is sporadic.  
 
Researchers and policymakers must be wary of taking what is said in literature reviews and 
reports at face value since although they aggregate sources that have been peer-reviewed, 
they themselves tend to not be peer-reviewed. Moreover, the correlations between economic 
growth and ICT uptake as well as ICT uptake and productivity tend to be highly 
heterogeneous, with some countries, regions and sectors showing stronger correlations than 
others, and some barely showing a correlation at all. Section 2.1.1 shows that the effect 
seems to be weaker in Panama than it is in Ecuador or China, while the Philippines and 
Senegal did not show much of a correlation. Moreover the table in 2.1.1 shows that the 
effect seems to be larger in Latin America and the Caribbean than in the OECD as well as in 
developing countries when compared with developed ones. Further, the aforementioned 
Qiang et al. (2009) and Scott (2012) studies need to be updated to reflect the ICT 
technologies available today. There is a lack of studies that measure the impact of switching 
mobile phone network speeds (from 2G to 3G or from 3G to 4G, for example). Studies 
measuring the economic impact of ICTs should be updated periodically in order to reflect the 
array of technologies available at any given moment or at least to help policymakers make a 
decision about whether the upgrade is worth it.  
 
Moreover, the mechanisms by which ICTs are expected to spur economic growth are mostly 
mentioned in passing without much effort to quantify if and to what extent they are occurring 
and/or if they facilitate growth and under what conditions. Although the literature has 
suggested the potential of countries leapfrogging with digital technology, evidence does not 
yet support this claim. The evidence is also inconclusive on whether digital technologies lead 
to poverty reduction. ICTs have been shown to be correlated with poverty reduction in some 
contexts, but have also been shown to divert spending from essential resources, further 
placing financial burden on the poor in other contexts; poor people don’t always seem to use 
them for economic purposes. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that ICT uptake automatically 
leads to poverty reduction. If it does, it is likely to occur under the right circumstances.  
 
We seem to be past the days of Solow’s Paradox in which there was no clear relationship 
between productivity and ICT uptake. ICTs were not showing up in the productivity statistics 
of developing countries for a long time, but that has now changed and they now tend to 
show a stronger relationship than developed countries. However, the causality issue 
emerges here as well. There seems to be a revolving door where more productive firms are 
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more likely to have the absorptive capacity to adopt productive technologies. As the 2016 
World Development Report says:  
 
A positive productivity correlation in the data might simply capture that more 
productive firms use digital technology more effectively, indicating that other 
potentially unobservable firm-specific factors explain the positive correlation between 
digital technologies and firm productivity. 
(World Bank 2016: 56) 
 
Productivity and ICT adoption correlations tend to be heterogeneous between countries, 
within countries, between sectors, within sectors, and between firms that do and do not 
export. There also seems to be a lag between the investment and productivity gains. Firms 
unable to complement technologies are generally unable to extract as many gains as those 
that restructure their organisational charts and upgrade their skill levels. Generally, the 
literature on the impact of ICTs on economic growth and productivity tend to be concentrated 
at the macro level. However, when these studies are juxtaposed against studies at the micro 
level, some of their assumptions seem to break down. Although there are examples of 
micro-entrepreneurs gaining from ICTs, there is also evidence that many micro-
entrepreneurs choose not to use mobile phones for business purposes even if they own one. 
Mobile phones seem to have tackled information asymmetries in some markets and regions, 
but Jagun et al. (2008) provides an example of mobile phones further entrenching 
intermediation and inequalities between those with and those without information. Thus, 
although ICTs have the potential to overcome information asymmetries, they cannot be 
assumed to do so automatically. Deeper understandings of the context receiving ICTs may 
help policymakers understand whether ICTs alone will overcome information asymmetries 
and growth barriers or if further steps need to be taken for mobile phones to overcome pre-
existing inefficiencies. Moreover, studies on the impact of ICTs on economic growth and 
productivity overemphasise access over use. Individuals or firms using the technology once 
in 365 days are typically counted as equal users to those using digital technologies all 365 
days of the year. Understanding how increased use of ICTs affects growth and productivity 
may give us a better understanding of their ‘transformative potential’ and a better 
understanding of the digital divide in general.  
 
There is an ongoing and unresolved debate between scholars on the importance of the 
Digital Revolution in terms of productivity and improvement in living standards. One group of 
scholars including Eric Cowen and Robert Gordon argue that productivity is on the decline 
while another group including Erik Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee and Kevin Kelly argue that 
productivity is being underestimated because measurements and workers are unable to 
keep up with the technology and because we are unlikely to have seen the real productivity 
gains from the Digital Revolution. This debate remains quite speculative and only time will 
tell.   
 
Although past anecdotal evidence has shown ICTs to be a net job creator, there are fears of 
widespread job dislocation in the near future both in developed and developing countries 
with a majority of jobs in the world susceptible to automation (World Bank 2016). The ability 
of ICTs to perform new tasks is accelerating at an unprecedented rate and machines are 
increasingly creeping into tasks that were once seen as ‘human’. Here the debate tends not 
to be about whether there is a threat of automation, computerisation and robotisation, but 
more about society’s ability to recreate good jobs in the long run. On the one hand Tyler 
Cowen and Lawrence Summers warn of a future of mass unemployment and high inequality. 
On the other hand, Erik Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee and Kevin Kelly project a future in 
which humankind will be able to race with machines and augment each other’s work, 
performing tasks that will be different from anything we can imagine today. This is once 
again a speculative debate and only time will tell. However, if digital technology is to 
continue progressing at the rate it is expected to, policymakers may want to consider 
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strategies to race with the machines and achieve augmentation. At the moment, these 
strategies seem constricted to a small fraction of society that is capable of complementing 
machines, but this need not be the case in the future. 
 
As well as changing the traditional way of work, the internet has given new ways of working 
and new employer–employee relationships. Remote microwork and freelancing over the 
internet have been identified as an opportunity for developing countries. However, online 
outsourcing employment outcomes tend to be heavily unequal. The majority of work comes 
from anglophone countries, placing a barrier on non-English speakers, and the majority of 
freelance work requires a high level of expertise which is often only attainable with a tertiary 
degree. Impact outsourcing for digital jobs is being promoted as a way of bringing 
marginalised youths into the workforce and providing them with ‘ICT jobs’. Although these 
youths are labelled ‘marginalised’, there are high barriers to entry for the most marginalised 
to participate in the programme, including a secondary education and [digital] literacy skills. 
Moreover, policymakers should be aware that a reliance on call centre outsourcing on its 
own is unlikely to help youths develop higher-level ICT skills related to innovation, design, 
programming and content creation. A greater emphasis should be placed on the ability to 
develop the types of skills that will be in demand in the future of work, those that allow 
workers to complement machines rather than perform tasks that may soon be automated.  
 
Digital technologies seem to have increased inequality through the digitalisation of analogue 
functions, the facilitation of disproportionate winners and superstars, the creation of winner-
takes-all markets, and an evolving skillset susceptible to automation. These mechanisms 
have led to a decoupling of wages and productivity and a shift in the distribution of wages in 
developed countries into the hands of fewer people (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). 
Although most of the literature concerned with digital technology’s effect on income 
inequality tends to focus on developed countries, evidence is now surfacing showing the 
same relationship in developing countries. Technological change also seems to be leading 
to an increasing skills premium and a hollowing out of the middle class in most developing 
countries studied (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). Evidence from developed countries 
suggests that automation and increasing skills premiums occur in waves during and right 
after recessions rather than gradually (Jaimovich and Siu 2015; Gaggl and Kaufmann 2015). 
This relationship has not been studied in developing countries. It would be useful to know if 
the same phenomenon persists in developing countries. Knowing whether it does could help 
prepare policymakers for the next and subsequent financial downturns as well as help them 
avoid implementing policies that have the potential to accelerate the automation of jobs.  
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